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Behavioral Economics and Health Annual Symposium
Abstract
The application of behavioral economics to health and health care has captured the imagination of
policymakers across the political spectrum. The idea is that many people are irrational in predictable ways, and
that this both contributes to unhealthy behaviors like smoking and holds one of the keys to changing those
behaviors. Because health care costs continue to increase, and a substantial portion of costs are incurred
because of unhealthy behaviors, employers and insurers have great interest in using financial incentives to
change behaviors. However, it is in the details that complexity and controversies emerge. Who should the
targets be, and what outcomes should be rewarded? How should incentives be structured, to maximize their
effectiveness and minimize unintended consequences? In what situations should we be intervening to affect
decisions by people who may prefer to be obese or to smoke, and in what situations should we accept their
preferences?
To begin to answer these questions, the Penn-CMU Roybal P30 Center on Behavioral Economics and Health
held its first annual Behavioral Economics and Health Symposium on March 24-25, 2011 with support from
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The symposium drew more than 50 researchers, scholars, and health
professionals from a variety of disciplines, including medicine, public health, economics, law, management,
marketing, and psychology. They heard perspectives on behavioral economics from public and private
funders, the CEO of the University of Pennsylvania Health System, and the CEO of stickK.com, a start-up
company that uses online, voluntary commitment contracts to help people achieve their goals. Participants
formed eight working groups to review the current state-of-the-art in a variety of clinical contexts and to
consider how behavioral economics could inform a research agenda to improve health. This Issue Brief
summarizes the findings of these working groups and the symposium.
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Editor’s note: The application of behavioral economics to health and health care has captured the imagination of 
policymakers across the political spectrum. The idea is that many people are irrational in predictable ways, and that 
this both contributes to unhealthy behaviors like smoking and holds one of the keys to changing those behaviors. 
Because health care costs continue to increase, and a substantial portion of costs are incurred because of unhealthy 
behaviors, employers and insurers have great interest in using financial incentives to change behaviors. However, it 
is in the details that complexity and controversies emerge. Who should the targets be, and what outcomes should 
be rewarded? How should incentives be structured, to maximize their effectiveness and minimize unintended 
consequences? In what situations should we be intervening to affect decisions by people who may prefer to be obese 
or to smoke, and in what situations should we accept their preferences? 
To begin to answer these questions, the Penn-CMU Roybal P30 Center on Behavioral Economics and Health held 
its first annual Behavioral Economics and Health Symposium on March 24-25, 2011 with support from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation. The symposium drew more than 50 researchers, scholars, and health professionals from 
a variety of disciplines, including medicine, public health, economics, law, management, marketing, and psychology. 
They heard perspectives on behavioral economics from public and private funders, the CEO of the University 
of Pennsylvania Health System, and the CEO of stickK.com, a start-up company that uses online, voluntary 
commitment contracts to help people achieve their goals. Participants formed eight working groups to review 
the current state-of-the-art in a variety of clinical contexts and to consider how behavioral economics could 
inform a research agenda to improve health. This Issue Brief summarizes the findings of these working groups and 
the symposium.
Dr. Lowenstein balanced enthusiasm for the potential 
of behavioral economics to improve health with 
concerns about how incentive programs might actually 
be used. More than 50% of all large employers are 
now incorporating incentives in 2011 health plans. 
Setting the stage: introductory remarks by George Lowenstein, PhD, Co-Director of the 
Penn-CMU Roybal Center
The 2010 Affordable Care Act will likely spur further 
interest, because as of 2014 it allows employers to use 
up to 50% of health insurance premiums as incentives 
for employees to achieve outcome-based wellness 
goals (Section 2705, also known as “The Safeway 
Amendment”). How can behavioral economic solutions 
augment, rather than supplant, other effective strategies 
to improve health, such as new laws or price changes?
 He noted that unhealthy behaviors are ubiquitous, 
leading to rising obesity rates, deaths from tobacco 
and alcohol use, and poor adherence to medications. 
These behaviors persist, he said, because they reflect 
“internalities,” costs for the individual that are not 
recognized in the present and that reflect self-control 
problems and inconsistency in preferences over time. 
For example, the same individual who wants to lose 
weight in the future will often continue to eat too 
much and not exercise enough in the present because 
the costs of changing those behaviors loom very large 
in the present and the benefits are somewhat intangible 
and far away in the future. Behavioral economics 
recognizes that such inconsistencies are common and 
that interventions to be successful must address these 
issues. One approach is by substituting immediate, 
tangible costs and benefits for internalities.
 Decision Error Potential Response
	 Present-biased	preferences	(myopia)	 Make	rewards	for	beneficial	behavior	frequent	and	immediate
	 Framing	and	segregating	rewards	 Reward	more	likely	to	be	effective	than	discount	on	premium
	 Overweighting	small	probabilities	 Provide	probabilistic	rewards,	such	as	a	lottery
	 Regret	aversion	 Tell	people	they	would	have	won	had	they	sustained	beneficial	behavior
	 Optimism	bias	 Encourage	pre-commitment	and	goal	setting
	 Loss	aversion	 Put	rewards	at	risk	if	behavior	doesn’t	change
Incentive programs have been effective in changing 
certain health behaviors, such as substance abuse. 
The ongoing challenge is to apply behavioral economic 
Behavioral economics: applying what we know
principles to “supercharge” incentives using 
common errors in our decisionmaking processes, 
as shown below: 
A panel of private and public funders laid out the 
pressing problems they were grappling with in their 
efforts to improve health and health care. Collectively, 
they stressed that they were looking for innovative 
Funders looking for answers
and implementable solutions to some of the most 
vexing problems in health, such as obesity, diabetes, 
drug abuse, and medication adherence. They urged 
behavioral economists to focus on these priorities and 
suggested mechanisms for securing funding.
Employers, employees, and payers are considering 
how behavioral economics can inform decisions about 
health plan benefits. Decision points occur around 
which health plan to choose (through cafeteria plans 
or individual health exchanges), which plan features to 
Group presentation on health insurance benefit design: simplifying choices
choose (coverage, copays, deductibles, premiums), and 
how and when to utilize coverage. 
 Research in fields other than health provides a basis 
for understanding the factors that influence choices at 
the health benefit level. From the financial field, for 
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example, we know that complexity can cause delay and 
confusion, and default options can have a dramatic 
effect on choices. Thus, completion of college financial 
aid applications improved with the introduction of a 
standardized form and structured options; participation 
in 401(k) retirement plans increased greatly by 
simplifying the enrollment process and through 
changing defaults to make enrollment an opt-out as 
opposed to an opt-in. 
 The group suggested a research agenda that focuses 
on the following questions pertaining to health 
insurance benefit design:
•	 Prices:	How	do	people	think	about	prices	in	the	
context of health? When do people respond to price 
levers? Do people use price as a signal for quality? 
•	 Psychological	aspects	of	cost-sharing:	how	do	people	
respond to low deductibles vs. low copays? Do 
people prefer all-inclusive plans to avoid having to 
pay at multiple times?
•	 Complexity:	When	and	how	should	choices	be	made	
simpler? Is there a role for purposeful complexity? 
•	 Targeting:	Where	and	when	do	we	want	to	target	
interventions (patients, providers, employers, 
insurers)? Is payment structure too crude a tool?
The group focused on three types of screening: 
health risk assessments (HRAs), HIV screening, and 
cancer screening. Financial incentives have been 
used to increase rates of HRA completion, although 
the evidence for whether HRA completion leads to 
subsequent changes in behavior is limited. Financial 
Group presentation on screening: what do people really want?
incentives have also been effective in increasing HIV 
screening rates, although the effects are not linear. 
However, HIV screening has not been shown to be 
a cost-effective way to reduce transmission of HIV. 
Most strategies to increase cancer screening have 
been educational (providing information to groups 
Financial incentives targeted to providers (pay-for-
performance, or P4P) have been touted as a way for 
clinicians, hospitals, and health care systems to improve 
the quality of care they deliver. Providers are rewarded 
for reaching pre-defined benchmarks and quality 
measures. Large health plans, employers and state 
Medicaid agencies are now implementing various kinds 
of P4P programs.
 The group noted that provider incentives have great 
potential to affect outcomes, but we lack sufficient 
evidence about effective approaches to structuring the 
incentives. Rigorous studies of P4P in health care are 
few, and overall findings are mixed, even for large 
dollar amounts.
Group presentation on provider incentives: targets and teams
Research should focus on:
•	 Broader	outcomes:	clinical	outcomes	beyond	
the target outcome; costs; static outcomes versus 
dynamic changes in outcomes; process outcomes; 
patient satisfaction; trust in provider
•	 Targets	of	incentives:	individuals	vs.	teams;	how	
to define the team, and how to structure team 
incentives. Team incentives often turn into 
risk-sharing arrangements that may not 
improve outcomes.
•	 Interaction	of	incentives	and	social	factors,	as	
incentives are likely to be responsive to context
•	 Interaction	of	patient	and	provider	incentives
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In the face of rising rates of obesity, and despite the 
knowledge of the benefits of weight loss, the vast 
majority of people fail in attempts to lose weight and 
keep it off. 
 In terms of exercise, studies show that people 
overestimate how much they will go to the gym, and 
underestimate the value of forming exercise habits. 
Behavioral economics may help us design more 
effective interventions to increase exercise, improve 
diet, and achieve and sustain weight loss. Lotteries and 
deposit contracts have been effective in achieving initial 
weight loss, but the effects were not sustained. Ongoing 
studies are evaluating the effects of combining financial 
incentives, group rewards, and peer networks.
 The group defined the following areas for 
future research:
Group presentation on obesity and physical activity: hard to maintain
•	 What	are	the	right	things	to	reward:	weight,	body	
fat, exercise? How do we measure them accurately in 
scalable ways?
•	 How	do	we	avoid	perverse	effects,	such	as	purging	or	
discouraging muscle gain?
•	 What	is	the	cost	effectiveness	of	a)	incentives	vs.	
other approaches; b) various incentive designs?
•	 How	do	we	help	people	form	durable	habits?
•	 How	much	should	we	worry	about	extrinsic	rewards	
crowding out intrinsic motivation? 
•	 How	do	we	tailor	interventions	to	the	enrollee? 
To what extent should people choose their own 
goal? Can people accurately predict what will work 
for them?
•	 What	are	the	health	consequences	of	(e.g.)	exercising	
for six months, but then relapsing?
•	 Should	financial	incentives	be	paired	with	other	
weight loss/maintenance interventions?
or individuals), and reducing barriers to care by 
eliminating copays. Financial incentives to physicians 
have had limited success.
 The group noted that important gaps remain in our 
basic understanding of people’s motivations around 
screening. Knowing people’s reasons for not being 
screened may affect whether and how we intervene. 
Behavioral economic interventions might best be 
targeted, at least initially, to people who want to be 
screened but have failed to do so.
 The group suggested a research agenda that would 
help us more broadly to understand when to intervene, 
and whether to use pre-commitment strategies, default 
options, and/or financial incentives to change behavior. 
A fruitful avenue for research lies in systematic 
assessment of:
•	 knowledge	and	intentions	about	screening;
•	 expectations	and	beliefs	about	health;
•	 how	expectations	and	beliefs	would	change	by	
screening; 
•	 the	comparative	effectiveness	of	pre-commitment	
strategies, default options, and/or financial incentives 
in changing behavior.
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Policymakers and employers are looking to Value-
based Insurance Design (VBID) as a way to improve 
medication adherence. VBID looks to reduce barriers 
to, and promote use of, high-value health care. Because 
medication adherence worsens when patients face 
increasing copayments, it seems reasonable to assume 
that reducing copayments would lead to improved 
adherence. However, studies have shown that reducing 
copays is relatively ineffective at improving adherence, 
possibly because the change in amounts is small, or the 
feedback too infrequent. Behavioral economics 
can be used to refine VBID programs and improve 
medication adherence. 
 The group noted that investment in information 
technology is critical for behavioral economic 
Group presentation on medication adherence: not just about copays
interventions to be able to provide frequent, ongoing 
feedback at low cost and at scale. They recommended 
a research agenda for applying behavioral economic 
methods to medication adherence, including:
•	 How	can	we	incentivize	sustainable	behavior	change:	
what are the optimal dollar amounts for incentives, 
and do they vary by socioeconomic status? What 
are the spillover effects to other non-incentivized 
medications? 
•	 How	can	we	combine	incentives	for	providers 
and patients?
•	 Can	we	target	non-adherents?	Can	we	target	people	
based on risk for non-adherence?
•	 Can	we	use	social	psychological	nudges	to 
sustain adherence?    
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In response to rising rates of obesity, policymakers have 
looked to food labeling to enable and encourage people 
to make better food choices. In theory, food labeling 
can affect consumer behavior by providing information 
to individuals, thereby fostering learning and salience 
about nutrition. It might also affect supplier behavior 
by having a shaming effect on restaurants, which might 
offer more nutritious selections. The 2010 Affordable 
Care Act mandates calorie listings on the menu boards 
of chain restaurants with 20 or more locations. 
 But studies show that present labels have not had 
much effect on people’s food choices. Behavioral 
economics suggests that information alone will not 
lead to dietary changes, especially if the information 
is complex or consumers lack background knowledge, 
such as how many calories they “should” eat.
 The group outlined a research agenda that addresses 
challenges in making food labels effective, such as:
Group presentation on food labeling: changes needed
•	 Understandability:	simplifying	food	labels;	testing	
numerical scales; altering the visual presentation
•	 Personalization:	how	to	make	labels	more	specific	to	
individual dietary needs
•	 Balancing	single	choices	and	overall	diet
•	 Behavioral	factors:	Positive	vs.	negative	framing;	self-
control issues
•	 Tradeoffs	between	improvements	in	health	and	
incremental cost
•	 Sources	of	information:	differential	responses	to	
government (mandated labels, required calorie 
postings); private firms (Hannaford’s guiding stars, 
Whole Foods’ aggregate nutrient density index, 
Subway’s low fat), or third parties (Weight Watchers, 
mobile apps)
The ethics group provided a framework for 
understanding the rationale for intervening with 
behavioral economics. Interventions might be justified 
because the externalities imposed (healthy subsidizing 
the unhealthy) seem unjust or inefficient; they could 
also be justified because the internalities imposed seem 
unduly burdensome and prompt a sense of beneficence 
toward individuals who can’t help themselves. The 
substantive question is: which internalities merit 
attention, and who decides? 
 Even if we can agree on the focus of interventions, 
significant ethical issues have arisen, and continue 
to arise, as we develop, test, and implement the 
interventions. Even a simple strategy of changing 
default options can unduly burden the person who 
might want to choose otherwise.
 The group highlighted the following ethical issues 
warranting attention as behavioral economics is applied 
to health:
•	 Level	of	the	intervention:	Are	we	implicitly	
burdening individuals with problems that should be 
Group presentation on ethics: are we nannying or nurturing?
tackled at the societal level? For example, should we 
pay people to lose weight or rather, subsidize food 
producers/farmers to produce healthier food?
•	 Autonomy	vs.	effectiveness:	In	designing	
interventions, how do we balance maximizing 
effectiveness with preserving individual choice? For 
example, in the United States, organ donation is a 
matter of simple consent. Some European nations 
have implemented presumed consent, in which 
someone must opt out of organ donation. Opt-out 
strategies increase the rate of consent, at the cost of 
some level of autonomy. 
•	 Fairness:	When	are	behavioral	economics	policy	
levers discriminatory? Are incentives equally 
effective across targeted individuals? People of 
low socioeconomic status may be subject to more 
incentives or “nudges.” However, they may also 
experience larger health benefits so the net impact 
may be favorable. The potential for discrimination is 
greater as the targeted behavior is less modifiable.
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The field of drug abuse treatment has had the longest 
experience with behavioral economic interventions and 
continues to experiment with ways to reinforce positive 
behaviors and combat relapse. 
 Work to date has discovered the importance of 
excessive discounting of delayed rewards among 
substance abusers, and the effectiveness of supplying 
alternative reinforcers (such as vouchers) in retaining 
people in treatment and encouraging abstinence.
 The group focused on three behavioral economic 
methods that hold the most promise for substance 
abuse treatment. These are:
•	 Pre-commitment:	self-imposed	internet	and	casino	
bans are an example of pre-commitment applied 
to the treatment of problem gambling. Can this 
Group presentation on substance abuse: strategies to abstain, quit and stay quit
strategy be applied to alcohol or illicit drugs? One 
idea for monitoring pre-commitments is to enable 
smartphone GPS tracking to alert a third party that 
an addict has entered a high-risk zone. 
•	 Incentives:	Could	pre-commitment	and	incentives	
be combined to prevent smoking initiation among 
teenagers? One idea is to create abstinence pledge 
at schools with a monthly lottery prize for testing 
negative for tobacco use. Can monthly lotteries be 
sed to prevent delayed relapse among addicts after 
the drug treatment phase?
•	 Substitution:	Since	drug	treatment	involves 
taking away something pleasurable, can we replace 
it with a new pleasurable activity? How can 
behavioral economics inform the selection of an 
effective substitute?
The symposium ended with three presentations 
summarizing the discussions and offering 
perspectives on themes that cut across the topics.
 Maxine Stitzer, PhD, Professor of Psychiatry and 
Behavioral Sciences at Johns Hopkins University, 
noted the tendency to look at behaviors individually. 
She urged participants to think about the larger 
box and consider multiple domains or problems 
concurrently. Doing so brings up questions about 
which bundles of behaviors can be addressed 
together, and in what order. In the realm of 
substance abuse, targeting one drug often has a 
beneficial effect on other drug use. She also stressed 
the importance of social reinforcement and the 
development of interventions that transform external 
tangible incentives to external social incentives. 
Lastly, she questioned where the money for financial 
incentives would come from, which is a large issue 
when working with community treatment providers.
 Brigitte Madrian, PhD, Professor of Public Policy 
and Corporate Management at Harvard, discussed 
the success of changing the default on retirement 
savings plans in changing behavior. Automatic 
enrollment worked so well, she said, for two reasons, 
first, most people want to save for retirement and 
second, automatic enrollment simplifies doing 
what most people already want to do. Intervention 
becomes more difficult, she noted, when what is 
easy and what people want is not the same. There 
are unsettled questions about what people want 
when it comes to health, and whether we can change 
what people want, through information, incentives, 
psychological interventions, or social interventions. 
Simplifying what people want to do can involve 
changing the product or the process. Throughout the 
symposium, groups discussed simplifying products, 
such as nutrition labels, prescription bottle caps 
Cross-cutting themes and wrap-up
and reminders, or prescription drugs. They also 
discussed changing processes through mandates, 
defaults, feedback, reminders, commitment devices, 
substitution, and aligning incentives.
 She concluded that further research should focus 
on which methods work best in what situations. 
How and when should we use the tools of behavioral 
economics to build the “house” – good health – and 
given constraints, which tools or set of tools are best 
to use? 
 David Asch, MD, MBA, Executive Director of 
the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics 
at Penn, noted the interest in behavioral economics 
from diverse stakeholders.  The symposium, he said, 
highlighted the considerable number of “known 
unknowns” in the field and laid the groundwork 
for a persuasive agenda for research and research 
funding. Some of the cross-cutting issues in applying 
behavioral economics to health are:
•	 The	underuse	of	recommended	care,	and	how	to	
address the deficiencies of providers, patients, and 
the health care system
•	 The	right	structure	for	incentives,	considering	
aspects such as size, frame, frequency, duration, 
form, and how these aspects interact with their 
context
•	 The	right	triggers	for	incentives	(whether 
process or outcome-based, single items or 
multifactorial indices, static thresholds or 
improvements from baseline) 
•	 The	right	ways	to	evaluate	incentives,	including	
outcomes such as clinical effectiveness, cost 
effectiveness, acceptability, spillover, crowd-out 
effects, endurance of effect, and changes over time
•	 The	effects	on	the	culture	of	personal	behavior, 
social relationships, intrinsic motivation, and 
personal responsibility
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